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With the Italian–HuŶgaƌiaŶ TƌeatǇ of FƌieŶdship fiƌŵed oŶ ϱ Apƌil ϭϵϮϳ, HuŶgaƌǇ’s 
most important ally became Italy who approached to Hungary due to political and 
economic interests. In 1927–1928 the two States made economic treaties. In 1929 
Iginio Brocchi drew up the plan of a customs union between Italy, Hungary and Austria, 
so he planned a trilateral contract. Its realization was very difficult for many reasons. 
After the economic crisis the European States realized the importance of the Danubian 
States’ ĐoopeƌatioŶ, so otheƌ faǀouƌaďle offeƌs ǁeƌe ŵade ďeside the tƌiple ďloĐ. And 
unless the Brocchi-plan was introduced as a bilateral contract with the signing of the 
Semmering Accord (1932), its non-viability cleared up soon. By 1933 the main problem 
of Europe was the Anschluss, and the States wanted to thwart it at any price. Because 
of this the Great Powers began to support the alliance of Hungary, Austria and Italy. 
The Hungarians and the Italians were always standing for it, and in this year they 
succeeded to convince Austria of its pertinence. The result was the signing of Roman 
Protocols on 17 March 1934.  
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The First World War has changed the European power system. The Austrian–
Hungarian Monarchy collapsed, and new, successor States replaced it. The 
collapse of the Monarchy made an end of the economic unity in the Danubian 
basin. By the 1920s the Great Powers realized they could get influence in the 
region mainly in its economic life. Especially France and Italy aimed this.  
In my essay I would like to present the aforementioned attempts made by Italy, 
in which Hungary played a key role after the Italian–Hungarian Treaty of 
Friendship. Following the world economic crisis, the States of Europe had different 
plans for managing it. Italy also had a concept made by the Italian economic 
diplomat Iginio Brocchi, who wanted a triple bloc between Italy, Hungary and 
Austria. In 1927–1928 bilateral Hungarian–Italian economic contracts were signed, 
then, from 1929, they wanted to realize the customs union planned by Brocchi. It 
did not succeed, but the Roman Protocols between Austria, Hungary and Italy 
firmed in 1934 included economic points.  
During the interwar period the economic relations of the two States were 
significants. Hereafter I ought to present these, based on primary sources (papers 
and contracts) that can be found in the Hungarian National Archives, and in the 
Italian Diplomatic Documents (I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani/Settima 
serie/Volume 6–14).1  
                                                             
1 The French Diplomatic Documents of the Carpathian Basin can be used as well: Magda ÁDÁM 
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The „loser-ǀiĐtoƌious” of the First World War, Italy preserved her ambitions for 
being a Great Power after the Versaille Peace System, too. She struggled to expand 
her influence in three directions. One was Africa where Italy wanted to gain colonies, 
the other was the Balkan, and the third – which is the most interesting for us – was 
the Danubian basin. Italy regarded for the two ulterior regions as bags with new 
possibilities.2 At the beginning of 1920s Italy ought to reach the wished influence in 
South West of Europe allying with the Little Entente States, so in 1924 she 
completed the Agreement of Rapallo signed on 12 November 1920 with Yugoslavia 
as a Treaty of Friendship,3 and she approached to Romania, as well. With the latter 
she made a contract on 16 September 1926. Its secret reservation said that if one of 
the two States began war with a third State, the other signatory would remain 
neutral.4 The establishment of this contract was possible because in 1926 the new 
Romanian Prime Minister had been Alexandru Averescu, friend of Italy.5  
In the same year Benito Mussolini planned a Danubian-Balkan alliance, 
modelling the Pact of Locarno of 1925 put across by the French and German 
Secretaries of State, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann. The idea of Mussolini 
– which is often called Balkan-Locarno since nowadays – aimed for a Romanian–
Bulgarian–Hungarian bloc under Italian leadership.6 This alliance of the four States 
                                                                                                                                              
(ed.): FƌaŶĐia diploŵáĐiai iƌatok a Káƌpát-ŵedeŶĐe töƌtéŶetéƌől, ϭϵϮϴ–1932. MTA TTI, Budapest, 2013. 
As for the literature used concerned, some essays were written about the economic plans and political 
concepts of the Great Powers: DIÓS)EGI László: A Tardieu-teƌǀ. FƌaŶĐia ǀálságŵeŶedzselési kíséƌlet 
Közép-EuƌópáďaŶ. Rubicon, 1994/8. DIÓS)EGI László: A Ŷagyhatalŵak és a DuŶa-medence az 1930-as 
éǀekďeŶ. IN: ROMSICS IgŶáĐ: Magyaƌoƌszág és a Ŷagyhatalŵak a ϮϬ. századďaŶ: taŶulŵáŶyok. Teleki 
László AlapítǀáŶǇ, Budapest, 1995. NICOLOSI, Simona: La politiƋue etƌaŶgéƌe italiaŶŶe eŶ Euƌope 
Danubienne: le pƌojét BƌoĐĐhi. Specimina nova dissertationum ex Institutio Historico Universitas 
Quinqueecclesiensis, 2005/2. PÖLÖSKEI FeƌeŶĐ: Magyaƌoƌszág és a Ŷagyhatalŵak az ϭϵϮϬ-as éǀekďeŶ. 
IN: ROMSICS IgŶáĐ: Magyaƌoƌszág és a Ŷagyhatalŵak a ϮϬ. századďaŶ: taŶulŵáŶyok. Teleki László 
AlapítǀáŶǇ, Budapest, 1995. The role of Italy in the Hungarian policy during the Interwar period is 
presented by ORMOS Máƌia: BethleŶ koŶĐepĐiója az olasz–ŵagyaƌ szöǀetségƌől (ϭϵϮϳ–1931), 
TöƌtéŶelŵi Szeŵle, ϭϵϳϭ/ϭ-2. Among the monographies the books about the Italian and Hungarian 
foreign policy can be used: BURGWYN, Henry James: Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period: 1918–
1940. Praeger, London, 1997. CAROCCI, Giampiero: La politiĐa esteƌa dell’Italia fasĐista, ϭϵϮ5–1928. 
Laterza, Bari, 1969. JUHÁS) GǇula: Magyaƌoƌszág külpolitikája ϭϵϭϵ-1945. Kossuth, Budapest, 1988. 
MÁRKUS László: A Káƌolyi Gyula-koƌŵáŶy ďel-és külpolitikája. Budapest, 1968. NEMES Dezső: A 
Bethlen-koƌŵáŶy külpolitikája ϭϵϮϳ–1931-ben. Kossuth, Budapest, 1964. PRIT) Pál: Magyaƌoƌszág 
külpolitikája Göŵďös Gyula ŵiŶiszteƌelŶöksége idejéŶ: ϭϵϯϮ–1936. Akadéŵiai, Budapest, 1982. The 
books written by foreigner writers mainly enforce the Balkan policy of Italy, which is not so important 
iŶ ŵǇ essaǇ. The FƌeŶĐh foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ is pƌeseŶted ďǇ Máƌia ORMOS - FƌaŶĐiaoƌszág és a keleti 
ďiztoŶság, ϭϵϯϭ–1936. Akadéŵiai, Budapest, 1969. GǇöƌgǇ RÁNKI ‒ Gazdaság és külpolitika: a 
Ŷagyhatalŵak haƌĐa a délkelet-euƌópai hegeŵóŶiáéƌt (ϭϵϭϵ–1939). Magǀető, Budapest, ϭϵϴϭ. ‒ 
presents the Danubian economic plans of the Great Powers (1981). For the Italian–Hungarian relations 
duƌiŶg the Göŵďös GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt soŵe details ĐaŶ ďe fouŶd iŶ the ďook of GǇöƌgǇ RÉTI: Budapest–
Róŵa BeƌliŶ áƌŶyékáďaŶ. Budapest, ELTE Eötǀös ϭϵϵϴ.. 
2 CAROCCI (1969): 13–14. 
3 JUHÁS) (1988): 105. 
4 Ibid. 
5 CAROCCI (1969): 59. 
6 BURGWYN (1997): 36. 
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targeted the economic expansion of Italy, then, later, her hegemony.7 The Italian 
leader tried to gain Yugoslavia over for his plan so much that he even offered 
military alliance with her. But the Yugoslavs, in sight of the disapproval of the 
British Secretary of Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain, said no to the plan.8 In 
regard of the participants the plan was foredoomed to failure. To make its reasons 
clear I must refer to some events that had happened earlier. Romania became 
independent due to the Peace of San Stefano (1878) which closed the Russian–
Turkish War of 1877–1878. In the same year the Congress of Berlin was held 
where Romania received Northern-Dobruja. After the Second Balkan War in 1913 
the Treaty of Bucarest also adjudged Southern-Dobruja to the Romanians.9 So 
Bulgaria, in 1926, explained her insistence on Dobruja saying promptly „Ŷo” to the 
alliance of the four States.10 After the First World War Romania – inter alia – 
gained Transylvania, and since the contract planned by Mussolini presumed the 
return of the Hungarian-populated territories, she said „Ŷo” as well.11 Following 
this, the already mentioned Italian–Romanian Treaty was signed. 
After such antecedents Mussolini, by the end of 1926, decided that Italy had 
to return to her anti-Yugoslav policy and she would help the collapse of 
Yugoslavia at any costs. For this ambition Italy had already found the perfect 
partner in Hungary after the First World War, so our little homeland had been 
again in the lime-light of Italy (Italian politics). The only problem was that in the 
meantime Hungary even approached to Yugoslavia, against who had to act 
according to the Italian conception. Beyond this Hungary meant an excellent 
possibility for the Italian economic expansion in the Danubian basin. Weighted 
these up, Italy started to prevaricate. First, the Italian Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs Dino Grandi offered the involvement of Italy to make the Hungarian–
Yugoslav negotiations successful, flashing the possibility of a trial bloc. The 
ItaliaŶ eŶǀoǇ of Budapest EƌĐole DuƌiŶi di MoŶza aŶŶouŶĐed this plaŶ to IstǀáŶ 
Bethlen,12 who was one of the most significant Prime Ministers of the Horthy-era 
(1921–1931). He worked up the political conception of the regime. His foreign 
policy can be divided into two phases. Before 1926 it was passive, because the 
Entente States controlled Hungary both financially and militarily. By 1927 the 
control ceased and the „aĐtiǀe phase” of BethleŶ’s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ, ǁiĐh 
advertised revisionism, could be begun.13 Bethlen thought that Italy was able to 
help revisionism, because Mussolini also wanted to disrupt the status quo 
formed in Versaille. Beyond this, neither of the two States was interested in the 
expansion of the Slavs living in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union.14 
                                                             
7 NICOLOSI (2005): 285. 
8 CAROCCI (1969): 52. 
9 JELAVICH, Barbara: A BalkáŶ töƌtéŶete II. ϮϬ. század. Osiris, Budapest, 1996. 92. 
10 CAROCCI (1969): 52. 
11 BURGWYN (1997): 38. 
12 NEMES (1964) 44. 
13 ORMOS (1971): 135. 
14 CAROCCI (1969): 79. 
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Added to this, in the 1920s for Hungary the policy of Italy and France in 
Central-Europe was determining,15 and that time there was the possibility to 
associate with one of them. So Bethlen travelled to Rome and on 5 April 1927 the 
Agreement of Friendship, Peacemaking Procedure and Arbitration was signed. It 
stƌeŶgtheŶed ItalǇ’s CeŶtƌal-European positions,16 which can be considered as the 
basic condition, or beginning of the economic expansion of Italy. 
We can divide the Hungarian–Italian economic relations between 1927 and 
1934 into two phases. In 1927–1928 Hungarian–Italian bilateral contracts were 
made so that was the first phase. The second phase began with the birth of the 
Brocchi-plan (1929). Following that the allies were trying to make Austria involved 
in the economic cooperation, making their relations trilateral. The trial bloc was 
finally created by the Roman Protocols signed on 17 March of 1934.  
 
Years of the Hungarian–Italian economic agreements (1927–1928) 
 
Agreements of Fiume 
 
In October 1926, when Mussolini laboured for realizing the Italian–Hungarian 
alliance, he promised to give preferences to Hungary in Fiume.17 After firming the 
Treaty of Friendship it occurred soon because Italy was interested in quickening 
the tƌade of Fiuŵe’s poƌt iŶ oƌdeƌ to eŶaďle the toǁŶ to ƌe-occupy the position it 
possessed in Central-European commerce before the dissolution of the Monarchy. 
On 25 July 1927 the „Protocol for Developing the Hungarian Trade passing Fiume’s 
poƌt” was firmed. The agreement consisted of nine articles announcing that after 
giving effect to it, the items coming from Hungary would enjoy the same 
preferences in respect of common charges and sales tax as Italian items. So „there 
will be no difference between items transported on ships with the Italian flag or 
HuŶgaƌiaŶ flag”.18 The Italian Government would not only let Hungarian ships into 
the port, but it would also help Hungarian items to flow to Fiume. In exchange 
Hungary would have to set up a shipping company in the town within three 
months after the convention came into effect. By that time the signatories of the 
treaty would set up a joint committee for working out the details of preferences 
given to Hungary, and for the fixation of the carriages’ taƌiffs. IŶ additioŶ to these 
the Italian Government promised that cereal traditionally arriving on Italian 
railway would be directed to Fiume, as well.19 The protocol – completed with a 
point which made Hungary to set up a warehouse for Hungarian products, mainly 
                                                             
15 PÖLÖSKEI (1995): 97–98. 
16 ÁDÁM Magda: A kisantant. Kossuth, Budapest, 1981. 137. 
17 NEMES (1964): 45.  
18 Magyar Nemzeti Leǀéltáƌ Oƌszágos Leǀéltáƌa (MNL OL) K 70/ Bundle 335/Hungarian–Italian, 
1928–1934. 71. Hungarian–Italian PƌotoĐol foƌ DeǀelopiŶg of the HuŶgaƌiaŶ Tƌade passiŶg Fiuŵe’s poƌt. 
Citation in Hungarian: „Neŵ tétetik külöŶďség olasz loďogót ǀagy Magyaƌ loďogót ǀiselő hajókoŶ 
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cereal and sugar in Fiume – was put in effect on 18 November 1934.20  
One year after the protocol of 1927, on 11 June 1928 Italy and Hungary firmed an 
agreement of the „Financial Questions Revealed Due to Fiuŵe’s ItaliaŶ PossessioŶ”,21 
which confirmed the regulations of 27 March 1924.22 The treaty made in 1924 was 
necessary because in January 1924 Italy and Yugoslavia firmed the Roman Agreement 
which gave Fiume to Italy, so the sometime Hungarian port-town got into Italian 
authority. Hungary and ItalǇ ĐoŶtƌolled the liƋuidatioŶ of HuŶgaƌiaŶ ĐitizeŶs’ 
possessions in Italy. Based on the agreement of 1928 all the citizens of Fiume – 
including Hungarians as well – were Italian citizens, so inhabitants of Fiume were not 
concerned with these financial questions. Related to the settling of pre-war debts of 
Hungarian citizens living outside Fiume, but residing in Italy, the Italian demanders had 
to submit their claims within six months to the Hungarian State. If the settling did not 
succeed, the Italian demanders could ask the decision of joint arbitration. Hungarian 
citizens could pay their debts with their property found in Italy.23 This agreement was 
codified in Hungary in 1928 (article 23th).24 
 
The Attempt of the Italian Loan to Hungary 
 
It is well-known that after realizing the alliance, Mussolini promised military/ 
martial loan to Hungary. The Italian Government could not maintain this promise, 
supposedlǇ ďeĐause of ItalǇ’s gƌaǀe eĐoŶoŵiĐ situatioŶ. OŶ ϲ Apƌil ϭϵϮϲ the 
Hungarian Secretary of State Lajos Walko reported about the secret travelling of 
Bethlen to Milan, where he negotiated with Mussolini.25 The main topic of the 
meeting was the Hungarian treaty revision. Bethlen gave a note to Mussolini, in 
which he explained that military forces of the two States had to be warlike by 
1935. To this, Mussolini promised military training, weapons and a loan of 300 
million Hungarian „peŶgő”.26 Mussolini – afraid of international affairs – delayed 
the disbursement of the loan, and in October told to the Roman envoy of Hungary 
AŶdƌás HoƌǇ that the loaŶ Đould ďe giǀeŶ oŶlǇ iŶ puďliĐ, ǁith the ;falseͿ aiŵ of 
building bridges and roads.27 One year later Grandi again asked the patience of 
Hungarian leaders, alluding to the lack in the foreign currency of the Italian 
National Bank.28 Another option was the treaty of the Italian National Bank and 
the Hungarian Government to the disbursement of the loan, but Italians averted 
the offer with the reason that their Bank could not give loans to neither Foreigner, 
                                                             
20 Ibid. 
21 MNL OL/ Bundle 334/ Item 134/b. FiŶaŶĐial QuestioŶs Reǀealed Due to Fiuŵe’s ItaliaŶ 
Possession. 
22 In detail: http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=7606 (Download: 1. 11. 2013.) 
23 Ibid. 
24 http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=7742 (Download: 1. 11. 2013.) 
25 MNL OL/K 64/ Bundle 30./ Item 23. 245. Telegram of Lajos Walko, 6 April 1928. 
26 ORMOS (1971): 143. 
27 NEMES (1964) 108–109. 
28 MNL OL/K 64/ Bundle 35/ Item 23. 404. Negotiation of Bethlen and Grandi, 3 April 1929. 
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nor Inland Governments.29 This was obviously a trumped-up reason, because on 
14 November 1928 Mussolini suggested the cooperation of the Hungarian State 
and the Italian Bank, because a State could not give loans to another State. The 
Italians were afraid of the consequences of giving the loan, because if it had 
turned out, Italy would have been compromised before the other European 
countries. So Grandi announced that the aim of the money given by Italy had to be 
kept in secret.30 Italy could imagine the contract between the two National Banks, 
but it was not a possible solution for Hungary, for it would have meant a drawback 
to the Hungarian National Bank if it had been a borrower. If the Bank would take 
up the loan even so and give it to the Hungarian Government, the Bank had acted 
irregularly.31 Subsequently this, the plan was dropped. 
 
The Agreements of 4 July 1928 
 
It can be said that the Italian–Hungarian Commercial and Shipping Agreement of 
4 July 1928 was more successful than the contracts discussed earlier, because it was 
put in effect soon and was valid all along in the period examined. The Agreement 
ǁas sigŶed ďǇ AŶdƌás HoƌǇ aŶd attaĐhé Alfƌéd NiĐkl fƌoŵ HuŶgary, while from Italy 
the signatory – as usual – was Benito Mussolini.32 The signatories of the treaty 
arranged that they would vice versa guarantee the liberty of the commercial, the 
shippiŶg aŶd the otheƌ sigŶatoƌǇ’s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ƌights to eaĐh otheƌ. So the 
signatories could travel, settle down and trade into the territory of the other State, 
and they could have the same properties as the citizens of the given State. In each 
otheƌ’s ĐouŶtƌǇ the sigŶatoƌies Đould aƌƌaŶge theiƌ ĐoŵŵeƌĐial affaiƌs liďeƌallǇ aŶd 
they did not have to pay for this. They could practice industrial activities, too. The 
signatories acquitted from military service and from the payment of its obligations. If 
the taxes had caused any problem, the citizens of the other State had the right to the 
same financial litigation as the inland people. They applied the principle of maximum 
preferences to each otheƌ’s ƌaǁ ŵateƌials aŶd iŶdustƌial iteŵs. TheǇ did Ŷot 
aggƌaǀate the otheƌ paƌtǇ’s iŵpoƌt aŶd eǆpoƌt, aŶd theiƌ ĐoŵŵeƌĐe ǁith duties oƌ 
other abridgements. They used eased tariff for items taken on railway passing 
thƌough eaĐh otheƌ’s ĐouŶtƌǇ. The Agƌeement also announced that Hungarian ships 
arriving at Italian ports had the same rights as Italian ones.33 The Agreement signed 
for three years was codified in Hungary in 1929 (article 20th).34  
                                                             
29 ϲϭϯ. ;SigŶatuƌe uŶƌeadaďleͿ to ŵiŶistƌǇ of fiŶaŶĐe SáŶdoƌ Wekeƌle, Ϯϰ SepteŵďeƌϭϵϯϬ. 
30 I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani. Settima serie, Volume 6–14. A cura di Rodolfo Mosca. Libreria 
dello Stato, Roma, 1953. (DDI) 7/7. Document 73. Ercole Durini di Monza to Benito Mussolini, 14 
November 1928. 84. 
31 MNL OL/K 64/ Bundle 40/ Item 23. 618. (Signature unreadable) to ministƌǇ of fiŶaŶĐe SáŶdoƌ 
Wekerle, 26 September1930. 
32 MNL OL/K 70/ Bundle 334/ 1928-II-1-Italy. Italian–Hungarian Commercial and Shipping 
Agreement. 
33 Ibid. 
34 MNL OL/K 70/ Bundle 334/1928-II-1-Italy. 1928/33. 
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Hungary and Italy signed – together with the commercial contract, on 4 July 
1928 – the Agreement of Animal Health.35 Its main point was that the eased 
commercial conditions were also applicable for animals as well, but since the 
animals – especially the poultries – could diffuse illnesses, they could be imported 
only with a medical letter stating their healthiness. In case of animal carriages it 
was necessary to annex the certificate of origin, too.36  
* 
In 1929 the world economic crisis exploded, and because of its effect the countries 
of Europe made different attempts to manage the crisis. Both the little States earlier 
intentions of creating an independent economic policy and the Great Powers realized 
the necessity of economic cooperation in Central-Europe.37 In Italy the plan of the 
customs union between Italy, Hungary and Austria began to be outlined. Beside this 
Hungary – which is situated in the centre of the Danubian basin – received more offers 
from other States, so I think it is important to speak briefly about these, too.  
 
From the Brocchi-plan to the Roman Protocols (1929–1934) 
 
Plans for Economic Cooperation in the Danubian basin 
 
After the world economic crisis the Great European Powers, such as Great-
Britain, France, Italy and Germany all had a conception that aimed at economic 
cooperation. The little, but very ambitious Czechoslovakia also figured out a plan. 
The PƌesideŶt Eduaƌd BeŶeš aŶŶouŶĐed his ĐoŶĐeptioŶ, ǁith the aiŵ of a Đustoŵs 
union between Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, in November 1931.38 
Although the plan became public just in that year, Beneš had already spoken about 
it in 1928 to the States of the Little Entente. Then he had thought about an alliance 
of four States, where the fourth would have been Yugoslavia. The third member of 
the Little Entente, Romania would have been left out of the alliance.39 BeŶeš 
accepted that the plan – if it was realized – would make it possible for 
Czechoslovakia the retention of Hungarian-populated territories, the deepening of 
the alliance with Yugoslavia, and economic expansion in Austria.40 In the plan 
announced in public in 1931 neither Romania, nor Yugoslavia were mentioned, 
ďeĐause BeŶeš thought these tǁo States to be strongly German-orientated, and he 
wanted to close Germany from the Danubian basin. He thought that this offer 
would please both Great-Britain and Italy.41 
                                                             
35 MNL OL/K 70/ Bundle 334/1928-II-1-Italy. Agreement of Animal Health between Hungary 
and Italy. 
36 Ibid. 
37 DIÓS)EGI (1994): 13. 
38 DIÓS)EGI ;ϭϵϵϰͿ: 1. 
39 DDI/7./6. Document 444. Gabriele Preziosi (Envoy of Italy to Bucarest) to Mussolini, 30 June 
1928. 387–388. 
40 Ibid. 
41 DIÓS)EGI (1994): 1. 
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In March 1931 the possibility of a customs union between Austria and 
Germany became apparent, which scared most European States, as it seemed to 
be the „aŶteƌooŵ” of Anschluss, even though the two States said that the plan 
would have let the other countries to enter the union.42 This explanation, in fact, 
was for veiling their real plans. Romania and Yugoslavia liked the plan, because 
Germany offered preferences to their raw materials and farm products.43 Probably 
that is ǁhǇ BeŶeš said that these two had seemed German-orientated. Great-
Britain recieved the conception indifferently, but in France, Italy and 
Czechoslovakia it did not meet with success44 - moreover, it caused panic –, so the 
plan failed. 
The plan of the German–Austrian customs union was an excellent blind for 
BeŶeš to announce his own idea, because the Czechoslovakian–Austrian–
Hungarian alliance could be reasoned as if it would be necessary against the 
Anschluss.45 However, the plan displeased to the other Great-Powers, mainly to 
Germany.46 The Czechoslovakian conception was not welcomed neither in the 
States involved in, and – for reasons understandable – mainly Hungary was dead 
against it. Czechoslovakia and Hungary were in customs war with each other. In 
ϭϵϯϬ BeŶeš did Ŷot ƌenew the Czechoslovakian–Hungarian Commercial Agreement 
made in 1927, and he raised the customs of Hungarian cereal and animal imports. 
The Hungarian Government responded with the raising of the customs of 
Czechoslovakian industrial items.47 According to one French comment among 
Hungarians „no one showed the least interest for economic or political peace with 
Czechoslovakians. Beyond that it is probable that in the case of the Danubian 
cooperation neither their own ideas, nor the councils from Rome would make them 
to take sides with Prague”.48 
Although at the beginning England supported the plan of BeŶeš, iŶ DeĐeŵďeƌ 
1931 she said „Ŷo” after all, because by that time her own ideas began to be 
formed, as well. She thought that regarding the point of view of the economic life 
of the region the most fruitful solution would be the customs union of the six 
Danubian States, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria. The plan was nipped in the bud.49  
In his memorandum of 5 March 1932 the French Prime Ministeƌ AŶdƌé Taƌdieu 
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offered a preferential cooperation between Austria, Hungary and the three members 
of the Little Entente. His plan aimed – at least according to the Italian politicians – the 
removal of Austria and Hungary from Italy and Germany.50 The French plan, which 
actually had already been revealed in 1930, wanted to quicken the trade of cereals.51 
The Tardieu-plan met the most vehement opposition in Germany, because in case of 
its realization her South-West-European field would have been closed. But the German 
Government did not wish to oppose France straight, so she gathered allies. Germany 
thought that mostly she could count on Italy, so she approached either Italy or 
Hungary, and offered preferences to Romania, too.52 In her memorandum of 7 March 
1932 Italy did not openly opposed the plan, she rather explained her own ideas.53 This 
was the Brocchi-plan outlining for years, which Italy – in sight of the other concepts – 
wanted to realize as soon as possible..  
IstǀáŶ BethleŶ, iŶ oŶe of his speeĐhes, formed a common opinion of the plans 
of Taƌdieu, BeŶeš aŶd EŶglaŶd. He thought that the ideas lapsed because „they do 
not resolve the economic problems, they were born from political back-door 
intents, or vice versa, they could be said to be political plans covered with political 
mantle. They were invented for the aim of housing Hungary into the power 
structure of the Little Entente, without the satisfaction of the Hungarian revisionist 
Đlaiŵs.”54 The plan of Italy, which would withdraw Hungary in one bloc with 
Austria, not with the members of the Little Entente, was welcomed with much 
greater expectations in Hungary. 
 
The Brocchi-plan and Semmering 
 
In 1929 the Italian economist diplomat Iginio Brocchi began to work out a plan, 
which could make it possible to Italy the wished economic expansion in the 
Danubian basin. Originally the plan sought an Austrian–Hungarian agreement with 
the protectorate of Italy. The Italian–Austrian–Hungarian commercial zone created 
in this way would have been enlarged with Yugoslavia according to the conception 
of Brocchi.55 That Italy would like to make Austria involved in the Central-European 
economic cooperation came up first on 10 September 1929 in the official 
documents.56 Since that time the Italians had made advances towards Austria 
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economically as well as to Hungary, so it can be said that Italy was not so satisfied 
with the intensification of the bilateral Hungarian–Italian economic relations, but 
they had been thinking of economic expansion in the Danubian region.  
The original Brocchi-plan included three points. The first said that between the 
Danubian States the difficulties of the export of the agricultural products had to be 
ƌeleased ǁith the Đustoŵs taƌiff’s ƌeduĐtioŶ. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the seĐoŶd poiŶt the 
signatory countries would have to find banks that used the favourable tariffs 
created for the participants. The third point spoke about the enlargement of the 
agreement with Yugoslavia.57 The Yugoslavian State mentioned an excellent 
teƌƌitoƌǇ foƌ the paƌtiĐipaŶts’ eǆpoƌt, aŶd if she had joined, the commerce of Fiume 
and Trieste would be quickened.58 But Hungary wanted to discuss all details with 
Italy before other States entered the bloc, because she wished to make Italy form 
concrete offers and conditions.59 This was because Hungary was afraid that if the 
plan realized, the Italian industry would gather ground overly in our homeland.60  
On 4 December 1930 Brocchi explained that the involvement of Yugoslavia is 
necessary to make commercial ports directly accessible to Central-European 
States. As he could see, Germany wished the approach to the Danubian States, 
too. So BƌoĐĐhi suggested eǆaŵiŶiŶg GeƌŵaŶǇ’s iŶteŶtioŶs ǁith ĐautioŶ, ďeĐause 
the extraordinarily strong German industry meant concurrence to Italy. Brocchi 
thought that the biggest advantage for Italy was the economic cooperation with 
Hungary. Since Hungary was industrially under-developed, she could mean a 
significant territory for Italian export, while Italy could rectify her defects with 
Hungarian farm products.61 The Hungarian point of view of the plan was 
suŵŵaƌized ďǇ the deputǇ of the SeĐƌetaƌǇ of State SáŶdoƌ KhueŶ-HédeƌǀáƌǇ iŶ 
his memorandum.62 According to the note, the general economic crisis made the 
agrarian States think of preferential systems created on regional bases. Naturally, 
politiĐal ĐoŶĐepts had to ďe ĐoŶsideƌed as ǁell. SiŶĐe HuŶgaƌǇ’s eǆpoƌts ǁeƌe 
mainly farm products she was interested in the birth of a solution as soon as 
possible. Because of the already mentioned political view-points Hungary thought 
that the only possible partner between the countries who made an offer to her 
was Italy. According to the memorandum the two States would give preferences to 
each other on certain products. Hungary would transport cereals, flour, neat, pork 
and butter on low customs to Italy, while Italy would ship fruits, rice, cheese, 
automobile, machines, and products made of glass or textile.63 
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The Hungarian project actually corresponded to the Brocchi-plan, which – as 
we could see – gave secret preferences for the signatories and they provided 
bilateral preferences to each other in export primes.64 The signing of bilateral 
agreements occurred by 1931. In order to arrest the German–Austrian customs 
union, Brocchi explained in his memorandum of 26 March 1931 that Italy had to 
make an agreement with Austria that as long as the Italian–Austrian commercial 
accord lived the latter State could not make similar contracts with other 
countries.65 The Italian–Austrian Treaty of Friendship, which was the basis of 
introducing the Brocchi-system, was signed in February 1930.66 Almost one year 
later, on 26 January 1931 was made the Austrian–Hungarian Treaty of Friendship 
as an Agreement of Friendship, Peacemaking Procedure and Arbitration.67 Since 
the German–Austrian customs union meant an enticing offer to Austria, the Envoy 
of Italy to Budapest Mario Arlotta and Bethlen agreed that there is an urgent 
necessity to restart negotiations on the Brocchi-plaŶ’s ƌealizatioŶ.68 In May, after 
the fail of the German–Austrian customs union Grandi announced happily to 
Mussolini that either France or Germany promised not to obstacle the Italian 
projects.69 For the reason of this promise Grandi did not write anything. 
In July 1931 the Italian–Hungarian commercial agreement made in 1928 had 
staled, so on 21 July 1931 the signatories confirmed that –according to the 
conception of Brocchi – they would use reduced tariffs in their trading between each 
other. Hungary would export agricultural products to Italy, who would transport 
industrial items in return. The Italians would buy Hungarian products for 40 million 
lire, and Hungary would import Italian goods for 10 million lire.70 This agreement for 
exporting is known – by the place of its signature – as Semmering Accords. 
The procrastination of giving effect to the Semmering Accords supposedly 
happeŶed ďeĐause iŶ August ϭϵϯϭ HuŶgaƌǇ had a Ŷeǁ Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ, GǇula KáƌolǇi, 
who wished to have a good relationship with France as well. But at the same time 
Bethlen continued to play an important role both in the Hungarian internal affairs 
and in foreign policy. So it could happen that in February 1932 Bethlen travelled to 
Rome, and urged both the Italian–Austrian–Hungarian customs union and the 
promulgation of the Semmering Accords.71 So these were officially signed on 23 
February 1932, and it can be said as a result that the Brocchi-plan was realized 
partially. This signing did not mean the end of the agreements, because in order to 
prove without obstacles the commercial preferences fixed in Semmering the 
signatories had to found an incorporated company. So the Hungarian–Italian 
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Exporting Incorporated Company was born by the „Agreement on the Regulation of 
FiŶaŶĐial QuestioŶs of the Tƌade ďetǁeeŶ HuŶgaƌy aŶd Italy”.72 During the following 
negotiations in Rome the signatories agreed to found the incorporated company on 
12 August, and the firm would be registered within 10 days. The flaw of the 
agƌeeŵeŶt ǁas that ItalǇ had Ŷo faith iŶ the SeŵŵeƌiŶg AĐĐoƌds’ pƌaĐtiĐal 
application, and it was meant to be a political gesture towards Hungary.73 
Considering this fact, it can be said that the Brocchi-plan was unprosperous. 
 
The Roman Protocols 
 
Similarly to the realization of the Brocchi-plan, the signing of the Roman 
Protocols was the result of extended negotiations that continued for years. On 1 
OĐtoďeƌ ϭϵϯϮ the Ŷeǁ Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ of HuŶgaƌǇ had ďeeŶ GǇula Göŵďös, ǁho 
wished the consolidation of the Italian–Hungarian friendship and the approach of 
the two States to Germany in his foreign policy.74 He wrote a handwritten letter to 
Mussolini, in which – beyond expressing his friendly feelings to Italy – he brought 
up the reconsideration of the Italian–Austrian–Hungarian customs union 
suggested earlier by Bethlen. Further on, this union could be completed with 
Germany.75 Göŵďös ǀisited Roŵe on 9 November 1932. During his rest of three 
days the two Prime Ministers negotiated about the trial bloc, with the involvement 
of Austria. Since Austria opposed the customs union of the three countries, it was 
not created then, but they reached an agreement on a three-member joint 
committee, of which role was to further negotiate in the subject.76 Another 
committee was set for controlling the bilateral Italian–Hungarian commerce. This 
determined that the Hungarian cereal product had not been satisfying, so Hungary 
had to ƌaise heƌ aŶiŵal eǆpoƌt. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, MussoliŶi pƌoŵised Göŵďös that iŶ 
the futuƌe the tǁo States ǁould help eaĐh otheƌs’ eĐoŶoŵǇ.77  
SiŶĐe Göŵďös thought that to ƋuiĐkeŶ the HuŶgaƌiaŶ eĐoŶoŵǇ the paƌtŶeƌship of 
Germany was needed anyway, he did not give up his struggle for creating a foursome 
cooperation with Germany instead of the trial bloc. In the summer of 1933, he visited 
the new German chancellor Adolf Hitler with the aim of economic negotiations, and he 
spoke about his plan of an Italian–German–Austrian–Hungarian union to Hitler. The 
meeting caused surprise and displeasure in Italy.78 MaǇďe the ƌeasoŶ of Göŵďös’s 
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approach to Germany was the plan of a Four Power Pact between England, France, 
Germany and Italy invented by Mussolini. The plaŶ displeased Göŵďös ǁho ǁas afƌaid 
that its realization would have obstructed the Hungarian ambitions,79 so – being angry 
with Italy – he began to make up to others as well. Mussolini suggested in his original 
idea that „foƌ the EuƌopeaŶ peaĐe” the four Great Powers would not have to hold aloof 
the revision of the Versaille Peace System,80 but France pinned down the principle of 
status quo, so modifications were carried out on the project, and the Great Powers – 
together with Italy – accepted them in order to preclude the German expansion.81 So 
Göŵďös ǁas Ŷot aŶgƌǇ ǁith MussoliŶi ďeĐause of the plaŶ of the Fouƌ Poǁeƌ PaĐt, ďut 
for accepting the modifications which meant disadvantage for Hungary. In the Pact the 
four Great Powers agreed that they would help the economic and financial 
stabilization of Central-Europe.82 
After signing the Four Power Pact the main question of European diplomatic 
life became the Anschluss, or rather, the struggle for its to halt it. That is why 
Göŵďös thought it ǁas tiŵe to ďƌiŶg up the plan of the Italian–Austrian–
Hungarian customs union again, even if it was already evident by 1933 that the 
Brocchi-system was unrealizable in practice.83 The Austrian chancellor Engelbert 
Dollfuss thanked Mussolini his friendly behaviour with Austria, and he explained 
that he had not insisted on an economic and political cooperation with Italy and 
Hungary anymore, although he pinned down that he wanted to have good 
relations with Germany as well.84 During the summer another very important thing 
happened after that the realization of the trial bloc was really wrapped up: France, 
ǁho ǁas ItalǇ’s ƌiǀal iŶ the DaŶuďiaŶ ďasiŶ, ƌeĐogŶized that ItalǇ ǁas the pƌiŶĐipal 
power in the region because the Danubian States were interested in Adriatic 
commercial.85 The final kick to Mussolini for the realization of the trial agreement 
was the signature of a contract which completed the Hungarian–German 
commercial accord made in 1931.86 In this new agreement, signed on 21 February 
1934, the signatories agreed that in the future Germany would buy the 
overproduction of Hungarian wheat. In exchange for it Hungary promised that in 
her foreign policy she would lean on Germany as much as on Italy.87 This contract 
made Mussolini awake to the fact that Italy had to consolidate her position in the 
Danubian region before the appearance of Germany.88 
On 14 March 1934, in Rome began the ŵeetiŶg of MussoliŶi, Göŵďös aŶd 
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Dollfuss,89 which ended with the signature of the Roman Protocols on 17 March. 
The Second Protocol was entitled to [Protocol – H. P.] „between Hungary, Austria 
aŶd Italy to ƋuiĐkeŶ the eĐoŶoŵy”.90 It explained that the aim of the protocol was 
to re-establish the economy of the Danubian States. For this, the three States gave 
pƌefeƌeŶĐes to eaĐh otheƌ’s eǆpoƌts so theiƌ ŶatioŶal economy was vice versa 
completed. They agreed to resolve the difficulties that concerned Hungary 
because of the falling of the wheat price. They would urge and make the traffic 
passing the Adriatic easier, and set up a committee of three members for 
controlling the economic development.91 The agreement included a secret 
protocol as well, in which the signatories agreed that Hungary would maintain a 
part of her market to Austria and Italy in return for the preferences given92 [they 
thought of resolving the difficulties because of the falling of the wheat price. – H. 
P.]. Austria also had to give preferences to the Italian import to Austria.93 
The agreement – except for Germany – was welcomed favourably in all Europe. 




To summarize, it can be said that with the Italian–Hungarian Treaty of 
FƌieŶdship ItalǇ ďeĐaŵe HuŶgaƌǇ’s ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt paƌtŶeƌ. Foƌ ItalǇ HuŶgaƌǇ ǁas 
significant for realizing the Italian economic plans in the Danubian basin. During 
1927–1928 the two States made bilateral contracts with each other, then in 1929 
the Brocchi-plan was born, which aimed a trial bloc with the involvement of 
Austria. On the basis of this plan were signed the Agreements of Semmering in 
1932 which proved to be inapplicable in practice. In 1933 the main problem of 
Europe was the Anschluss. To arrest it, the Great Powers supported the creation of 
the Italian–Austrian–Hungarian bloc, so on 17 March 1934 the guiders of the three 
States signed the Roman Protocols. It – in principle – established the contract 
which aimed the Italian economic expansion in the Danubian region, but – 
considering the fact that the protocols were not taken seriously – the expansion 
itself cannot be regarded to be realized. So, to sum up, the economic expansion of 
Italy remained an attempt without realization. 
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